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1. Introduction 
The topics of this Special Issue, concerned with the socio-political underpinnings of the 
management and organization of the multinational corporations (MNC), have so far been 
neglected and marginalized in the broad field of international business (Bélanger and 
Edwards, 2006; Ferner, 2000; Geppert and Williams, 2006). This is especially true of 
economic approaches which consider these issues mainly as macro-political effects on 
foreign direct investments (FDI) and risks of rational decision-making in MNCs. A closer 
look at three recently published leading handbooks in the field shows that these topics are 
not considered at all or have been approached either in rather narrow terms or as issues that 
are distracting and dysfunctional for the effective management and control of the MNC. 
 2
Economic studies of international business organizations theorize micro-politics in terms of 
externally caused events, such as when efficient decision-making is disturbed or blocked 
through external events reflecting the macro-political instability of the business 
environment, especially in certain host countries. Accordingly, micro-politics is discussed 
in the IEBM Handbook of International Business as ‘micro-personal political risks’ that 
managers might face when operating overseas. Thus, micro-political risks are seen ‘as 
dangers that apply strictly to individuals’, externally caused for example through politically 
motivated assassination, political kidnapping and consequent demand for ransom, or 
instances of forced evacuation from potentially hostile areas (Frank, 1998, p. 409). Given 
that this definition of micro-politics is a rather specific one and, what is more, far from 
getting close to any definition used in organization studies (see e.g. Hardy and Clegg, 1996, 
for an overview), it is indeed surprising that we found in the Oxford Handbook of 
International Business a brief reference to the topics, but again focusing on the macro-
political dimension of conflicts emerging through FDI in the context of nation states (Spar, 
2001, p. 213). Again, in the more recently published Blackwell Handbook of Global 
Management, our topics are not directly addressed – for instance in a separate chapter and 
only brief references to organizational politics and conflicts are made in two chapters. One 
refers to ‘managing conflict’ in culturally diverse global teams (Davison and Ekelund, 
2004, pp. 237-238) and the other to ‘resistance’ emerging in the creation of global 
organizations (Osland, 2004, pp. 136-137). 
 
The neglect and marginalization of the central themes of this Special Issue seem to be 
directly related to the functionalist bias in the mainstream literature of the field. Where 
power, politics and conflicts are discussed, they are mainly interpreted either as signs of  
“bad” (dysfunctional) management or simply as a misfit between the organizational design 
and certain aspects of external environmental features. Traditional research in international 
management, that draws “eclectically rather then systematically on organization theory” 
(Ghoshal and Westney 1993, p. 1), tends to use “neutral” terms and talks in terms of 
creating coherent and integrated management systems that spread transnationally, enable 
better (efficient) management and balance global and local pressures. In short, what is 
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missing in contemporary studies of the MNC is a systematic and in-depth discussion about 
the role of organizational power, politics, conflicts and resistance in MNCs, despite what 
Doz and Pralahad (1993, pp. 36-38) in their seminal article foresaw as the importance of 
these issues in outlining a new research paradigm.  
 
Exactly these concerns led us to organize two events where we focused on the issues of 
micro-politics and conflicts in MNCs: a subgroup of the annual colloquium of the European 
Group of Organization Studies in Ljubljana (Slovenia) in 2004 and a panel at the Critical 
Management Studies Conference in Cambridge (UK) in 2005. Some of the papers in this 
Special Issue were presented in Ljubljana and many ideas in this introduction are the result 
of discussions at both events. We would like to thank all participants for their stimulating 
contributions. 
 
We start this introductory article by giving a brief overview about how influential non-
economic approaches in international management have addressed the issues of power, 
politics and conflict in MNCs. The compiled papers in this Special Issue consider some of 
the shortcomings in the literature primarily from an organization-theoretical angle, but of 
course they cannot make up for the systematic neglect of these topics in existing 
international business research. We go on to indicate, however, where the contributing 
papers open up new ways of examining and researching micro-politics and conflicts in 
MNCs, both conceptually and empirically. Here we distinguish three conceptual frames of 
analyzing power, politics and conflicts in the MNC. In our concluding remarks, we propose 
possible directions for future research. 
 
2. Power, politics and conflicts in MNCs: A brief overview 
The mainstream literature was dominated for a long time by contingency approaches to the 
MNC. Leading scholars in the field, where they referred to power, politics and conflicts in 
MNC at all, discussed these issues predominantly from a functionalist perspective. Early 
approaches tended to see power and politics as phenomena which can be best tackled by 
adapting formal structures to address (more or less) stable or dynamic environmental 
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characteristics (e.g. Stopford and Wells, 1972). Power and influence were understood to be 
distributed along traditional hierarchical lines, with the headquarters (HQ) as the central 
authority formally making all strategic decisions and the subsidiaries mainly responsible for 
operational tasks. The key problem of HQ management was to balance local demands and 
resources with the global strategy of the firm (e.g. Kilduff, 1993). Politics and conflicts 
were not denied, but only interpreted as functional as long as they did not question the 
centrality and authority of HQ management to find the optimal solution for the local-global 
dilemma and, accordingly, the “optimal fit” to meet the environmental pressures of a more 
or less globalized task environment.  
 
In the studies that followed Bartlett and Ghoshal’s (1989) “Managing Across Borders”, the 
traditional view of the superiority of HQ management was not replaced but it was 
questioned and supplemented by a more pluralist view of power relations. In this 
perspective, the formal power of the HQ was understood to be limited. Global 
environmental pressures of markets, new technologies and even cultural convergence 
across national borders were seen as responsible for the emergence of transnationally 
‘differentiated networks’ (Nohria and Ghoshal, 1997) and the ‘diversified multinational 
corporation’ (Doz and Prahalad, 1993), in which power structures were more ambiguous 
and decentralized. However, few researchers directly addressed the new role of power and 
politics in this more informal and fragmented transnational organizational form. Bartlett 
and Ghoshal (1989) obviously preferred to discuss these issues in neutral terms, by 
referring to the appearance of organizational and cultural ‘barriers’ when developing the 
‘transnational solution’ and to the problems of how newly created decentralized subunits 
gain access to critical resources and strategic decision-making. However, in many studies 
examining new organizational forms in transnational firms, such as Nohria and Ghoshal’s 
(1997) “The Differentiated Network”, one could even go so far as to ask whether the 
authors deliberately avoided associating their research with issues of power and politics 
identified by Hardy and Clegg (1996). Such studies normatively presuppose that powerful 
HQ or subsidiary managers are able to coordinate and control the new organizational forms 
through socialization, shared values and normative integration. The underlying logic is that 
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managing the transnational culture will improve inter-functional and inter-departmental, 
HQ-subsidiary and inter-subsidiary communication (Nohria and Ghoshal, 1997, pp. 93-
149). A basic assumption seems to be that if managers develop a better understanding of 
the ‘transnational solution’ and better address cross-cultural and cross-divisional conflicts, 
the dysfunctional effects and illegitimate aspects of politics and power will hardly ever 
appear – they may even disappear. Such views fail to consider questions about whose 
interests are served by measures of cultural integration, who are the winners and losers 
when new inter-functional and HQ-subsidiary communication structures are implemented 
or how the work design and work tasks of non-managerial employees are affected. 
 
After reviewing international management publications, we think it no accident that – given 
the quantitative bias in top-ranking journals in the field such as the Journal of International 
Business Studies (Welch and Welch, 2004) – there are very few scholars developing an 
awareness of the increasing importance of power, politics and conflicts in newly emerging 
transnational organizational forms. Even though the topics of this Special Issue are indeed 
under-researched, we can identify two existing research streams, drawing on organization-
theoretical ideas in studying the MNC, which have begun to address the themes. First, there 
are studies in the tradition of the so called ‘evolutionary model’, which are interested in the 
political nature of the economic success of subsidiary-led innovation processes and 
entrepreneurship. Second, institutionalist studies of MNCs raise the political dimension of 
non-economic contextual rationalities that are related to home, host and third country 
institutional influences on the management of subsidiaries.  
 
The first stream of research stresses that traditional hierarchical power relations with the 
HQ as the key player are in decline because of the increasing pressure of globalized 
markets and technologies. They argue that the traditional hierarchical structures of the 
MNC based on formal authority relations between the HQ and its subsidiaries will be 
replaced by more de-centralized structures based on new and more complex 
interdependencies. It is expected that new power games and, accordingly, a greater variety 
of new power players emerging in these more decentralized MNCs require future research 
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attention in international management studies. Thus, Doz and Prahalad (1993), for example, 
argue that the diversity of power players and the personal strategies of local managers 
might matter more than those of HQ, depending on their own goals and the resources they 
control. The resources that subsidiary managers can draw on, however, could be both 
internally and externally based, an issue which is emphasized in a study analyzing the 
success and failure of entrepreneurial initiatives of subsidiaries. The authors argue that 
MNCs have an internal ‘corporate immune system’, a mixture of structural and cultural 
inertia, that blocks entrepreneurial initiatives and innovation (Birkinshaw and Ridderstrale, 
1999). This analysis based on case studies shows that internal resistance against subsidiary 
initiatives was expressed both from the HQ and from other subsidiaries competing for 
critical resources, and found that legitimizing new initiatives internally was more successful 
when circumventing the MNCs ‘immune system’. It was easier to legitimize a project that 
had already gained outside allies and proven to have market acceptance. Furthermore, the 
study of Forsgren (1989, p. 77) shows that micro-politics in subsidiaries cannot only be 
explained as ‘a general striving for autonomy’ within the multinational itself; political 
‘tensions’ also arise due to changes in the industrial network and local market in which a 
subsidiary is embedded. Forsgren et al. (2005) develop these ideas further. The empirically 
based study shows that the political influence of the subsidiary management and its 
functional importance within the MNC are closely linked to its embeddedness within both 
the corporate and the wider business network. Thus, unlike traditional studies addressing 
power issues in MNCs, Forsgren and his colleagues (2005, p. 128) give environmental 
contingencies ‘a face’. However, when rejecting the static top-down model of HQ power 
relations, these authors stress the influence of social networks and the importance of 
decentralized bargaining and negotiations, often de-centrally initiated by certain 
subsidiaries. However, a more detailed consideration of these negotiations is still missing.  
 
The nature of subsidiary power and the problems of local managers trying to influence 
corporate decisions and rules is another topic in this Special Issue. The papers of 
Dörrenbächer and Gammelgaard and Taplin discuss strategies and power games of 
subsidiary managers. Taplin shows that more participative management concepts initiated 
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by the HQs of textile firms do not necessarily support subsidiary managers in improving 
their current power base. For example some managers resisted the implementation of more 
flexible and de-centralized management modes to sustain or even improve their dominant 
positions, both within their local subsidiary and in relation to the HQ. The paper of 
Dörrenbächer and Gammelgaard shows that even in cases where foreign subsidiaries lack 
the power resources to influence HQ decisions, local mangers were able to get engaged into 
micro-political bargaining processes. This appeared to be crucial for them, since it was 
often the only way to make their counterparts in the HQ aware of the rather hidden 
capabilities of their subsidiaries and certain strategic options that lie beyond the immediate 
interests of the HQ. 
 
The second stream of research probably cannot yet be called mainstream within the field. 
Institutionalist approaches have only recently acquired importance in studying the MNC 
from an organization theoretical perspective, beyond the still dominant evolutionary school. 
While scholars of the first research stream emphasize the role of resource dependencies on 
the political influence of the various functional and regional subunits within the MNC, 
institutionalist researchers take a broader perspective, stressing the importance of the 
institutional embeddedness of the MNC as a whole and of its parts, such as the HQ and the 
subsidiaries. Emphasizing institutional environments, it is basically argued that a high 
degree of ‘institutional distance’ (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999) between the HQ and its 
subsidiaries causes problems for the MNC as a whole in achieving legitimacy, externally in 
the host country and internally within the MNC itself. Accordingly, various studies have 
found that both the home country institutions and the host country institutions, such as the 
educational system, the system of industrial relations, the financial system and the 
industrial policy of the national government – influence the MNC’s forms of control (e.g. 
Dörrenbächer, 2000; Harzing and Sorge, 2003), work systems (e.g. Geppert et al., 2003), 
production systems (e.g. Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1997) and employment practices (e.g. 
Edwards and Ferner, 2002). However, similar to the research on the evolution of the MNC, 
issues of power and politics have only rarely been considered. Only recently, have 
institutionalist researchers started to shed some light on the political nature of ‘contextual 
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rationalities’ (e.g. Morgan, 2001), micro-political game-playing, the emergence of 
‘battlefields’ (Kristensen and Zeitlin, 2001) and political issues in sensemaking (e.g. 
Geppert, 2003) in MNCs. Research has identified the emergence of ‘transnational social 
spaces’ in and around MNCs, which can be understood as arenas for political strategizing 
and power play. On one hand, national institutions have been shown to have continuing 
influence, for example, by providing host country managers with critical resources enabling 
them to resist HQ influences (e.g. Williams and Geppert, 2006). On the other hand, these 
studies have also found cases of misunderstandings between the HQ and its subsidiaries 
and between managers in different subsidiaries, creating ‘battlefields’ and severe conflicts 
(e.g. Kristensen and Zeitlin, 2001, 2005). 
 
Consideration of these issues is taken further in this Special Issue from more conceptual 
perspectives. Drawing on a combination of Scandinavian institutionalist research and 
structuration theory, Becker-Ritterspach (in this Special Issue) provides a framework to 
understand knowledge integration in MNCs as a dialectic transformation process that is 
constituted by human actors and social systems. The author argues that actors or groups of 
actors are differently affected and able to shape such processes on the basis of their 
organizational positioning. These matters are explored from another angle by Clark and 
Geppert (in this Special Issue), who focus on processes of institutional order-building in 
international ventures of Western MNCs in post-communist countries. They argue that the 
specific interplay between the strategic orientations of senior MNC managers and local 
managers’ perspectives strongly influences the emergent states of order or disorder in these 
international ventures. The interaction between foreign and local influences is also at the 
heart of the empirically based paper by Sharpe (in this Special Issue). This ethnographic 
study deals with management–worker relations on different sites of a Japanese MNC in the 
UK. Here, micro-political processes initiated by the management to gain social control over 
workers’ behavior and beliefs were balanced by the workers’ labor market experiences and 
their embeddedness within the wider societal culture, leading to both conflicting translation 
processes and ‘parallel universes’.  
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After showing the lack of systematic and in-depth research on power, politics and conflicts 
in MNCs and referring to some recent conceptual and empirical developments, we will 
briefly outline what research genuinely focusing on micro-politics and conflicts in the 
MNC encompasses, including some considerations of its theoretical foundations, emerging 
empirical questions and methodological problems.  
 
3. Micro-politics and conflicts in MNCs: Theoretical foundations, genuine empirical 
questions and methodological problems  
The focus on micro-politics in MNCs is first and foremost about bringing back the actors 
and examining the conflicts that emerge when powerful actors with different goals, 
interests and identities interact with each other locally and across national and functional 
borders. Despite some general claims to have incorporated actors’ strategies and interests 
(Doz and Prahalad, 1993) and a general rethinking of the mainly context-based 
understanding of organizations in terms of action theories since the 1980s, most empirical 
studies of organizational design and MNC strategies are still strongly influenced by 
contingency theories. Missing basic foundations of action theory, the actors involved in 
these studies remain relatively ‘faceless’, characterized on the whole one-dimensionally in 
terms of their actions or their (sub)organizational affiliation, or according to universal 
behavioral assumptions such as a general knowledge sharing hostility (Husted and 
Michailova, 2002) or a “not invented here” attitude (Edwards et al., 1999; Forsgren et al., 
1995). In contrast, genuine micro-political approaches do not see individual or corporate 
actors as merely executive organs of external institutional and task environment features. 
Instead, they conceptualize actors as being informed by structural and institutional 
constraints but at the same time taking into account their subjective interests in organizing 
and strategizing. Very often those interests are self-centred, defined genuinely by issues of 
gaining power and autonomy, and by career ambitions within in a certain subsidiary or 
within the MNC as a whole. However, they might also be shaped by altruistic ideas and 
beliefs (Ortmann, 1988), personal identity construction (Weick, 1995) or group dynamics 
(Lee and Lawrence, 1985). 
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Like all other forms of politics, organizational micro-politics are understood as an attempt 
to exert a formative influence on social structures and human relations. Securing options, 
realizing interests, and achieving success however take place in a contested terrain. Thus 
micro-political conflicts are everyday occurrences which can appear in every organization, 
including in MNCs. Moreover, these conflicts are a fundamental mechanism of social 
interactions which either can hold organizations together or lead to fragmentation and 
disintegration. Micro-politics can affect an MNC as a whole, for example, when they 
concern global business strategy. However, they also apply to medium range issues, such as 
when decisions are about the location of economic activity or the re-grading of subsidiary 
functions and mandates. Finally, micro-political conflicts occur at the departmental level in 
either the HQ or the subsidiaries, for instance over the development of external 
(international) contacts or the negotiation of budgetary issues. 
 
Despite a great variety of micro-political issues in MNCs, it is widely acknowledged that 
only a few powerful key actors usually get actively involved in micro-political strategizing, 
yet their interactions can have far-reaching consequences for all members of the 
organization (Burns, 1961). On the premises of strategic organizational analysis, which 
roots micro-political behavior of actors in the organizational framework of action, 
executives from both the HQ and subsidiaries seem to be the main “political brokers” 
(March, 1962, p. 672) in MNCs. Micro-politically inspired research has concentrated on 
these actors, since it is their respective orientations and strategizing that shapes the 
development of the MNC, reflecting an amalgam of 1) internal structures, coalitions and 
power relations, 2) external stakeholders’ interests and 3) subjective concerns about power, 
autonomy and career development. 
 
Theoretically, micro-political approaches touch upon determinism and voluntarism, 
integrating structural and action perspectives through the concept of micro-political games 
(Crozier and Friedberg, 1980). During these games - a large number of which are played 
both simultaneously and successively - the actors are bound by rules, restrictions and 
resources. However, these structural limitations also provide certain liberties (with actor-
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specific differences) that can be used for the implementation of actors’ tactics and 
strategies. According to Mintzberg (1983, p. 188), authority games, power building games, 
rivalry games and change games are of a special significance in organizations. Other 
authors distinguish between routine and innovative games or give a rather functional list 
including budgeting games, career games and reorganization games. Further investigation 
is required to determine more precisely what specific internationalization games exist in 
MNCs and what their characteristic features are. To be sure, internationalization issues do 
play a particularly important part in other games, for instance, in budgeting (Kristensen and 
Zeitlin, 2005) or career games (Dickman and Harris, 2005; Feldman and Thomas, 1992). 
But there are also strong arguments in support of the assumption of genuine 
internationalization games played by the main political brokers in MNCs, i.e. HQ and 
subsidiary managers.  
 
For instance, according to Morgan and Kristensen (2006, forthcoming), the outstanding 
position of the HQ in terms of power and access to distant units of the MNC allows HQ 
managers to play the ‘language game on globalization’. That is, they use the globalization 
metaphor to assert HQ’s interests in global standardization processes. Moreover, HQ 
managers are able to exploit their exclusive relationship with the shareholders of the MNC 
to impose the ‘investment bargaining and regime shopping game’ on its subsidiaries, using 
shareholders’ interests in return on investment as an argument to legitimize restructuring, 
internal investment competition and related benchmarking activities all over the MNC.  
 
Subsidiary managers in MNCs can also play internationalization games. In one game the 
local managers act as “interpreters” of rules of the game, which are often developed 
elsewhere and transferred locally in the MNC (Ferner, 2000). For example, the affiliation of 
expatriates to the HQ on the one hand and to the foreign subsidiary on the other is a 
situation that presents tactical and strategic alternatives otherwise unavailable in the 
national framework. Subsidiary managers can weaken, modify or ward off disagreeable and 
unreasonable requests from HQ by referring to the institutional structures in their country 
or to the political power of local actors in certain circumstances (for examples, see Becker-
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Ritterspach et al., 2002; Tempel, 2001). They can, for example, exploit existing differences 
in national work regulations. However, they can also functionalize the peculiarities of the 
‘insecurity zone’ (Crozier and Friedberg, 1980) that HQ managers in MNCs see themselves 
confronted with while controlling their subsidiaries, a game which capitalizes foreignness.  
 
Further research opportunities are not restricted to better elucidation and detection of new 
internationalization games. More empirical research and theorizing are especially needed 
with regard to actor rationales, communication and influence strategies and questions of 
MNC configuration.  
 
Up to now, most research on MNCs assumes that the rationales of the actors are shaped by 
contextual features of the organizational subunit to which they belong. Thus traditional 
research operates with quite restrictive assumptions about the relationship between actors 
and their organizations, neglecting the important impact of diverse rationalities which are 
shaped both socially and societally. All papers in this Special Issue clearly demonstrate 
these impacts. They demonstrate that changes of organizational structures and decision-
making processes require a less deterministic and more dialectical view of what constitutes 
learning and knowledge transfer across national and functional boundaries. From this 
perspective, actors are not ‘faceless’ as assumed by universalistic research on MNC 
evolution or in institutionalist studies on path-dependency. Focusing on the rationales and 
interests of key actors when developing strategies is about analyzing micro-political 
strategizing processes and the interaction of different key actors and their attempts to 
impose, negotiate, resist, accept or oppose certain rules of the game. Thus, compared to 
mainstream studies of political issues in MNCs, changes of organizational design and 
strategies in MNCs are understood not just as being externally constrained. Rather, political 
actors are pursuing their interests by enacting structural constraints (e.g. rules and 
resources) during micro-political games in the process of accepting or opposing the 
strategic approaches of the HQ and of other powerful internal and external stakeholders.  
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This leads us to a second area where more empirical research and theorizing are needed, 
namely the power strategies that actors use to influence the rules of the game. The extent to 
which actors are able to set their own rules of game, or in other words, the extent of their 
assertive power, depends on the degree of control over the insecurity zones in question. 
This has to do with the fact that potential antagonists in MNCs control areas or resources 
that one needs to set one’s own rules. The manner in which actors or groups of actors try to 
exert influence across geographical, political, socio-economic, cultural and religious 
distances associated with internationalization processes has so far been quite neglected. At 
any rate, one can expect different interests and strategies in developing rules at a more local 
or a more global (HQ-) level, for HQ and subsidiary managers and for different types of 
subsidiary managers (expatriates, locals bi-nationals, third country nationals). Differences 
might also be promoted by the overall strategic approach of the MNC. Thus, one can expect 
different requirements and possibilities for local managers in setting and negotiating their 
own rules in MNCs that apply a “polycentric-exploratory” strategy compared to MNCs 
with an “ethnocentric-exploitative” approach (see Clark and Geppert in this Special Issue).  
 
Both actor rationales and strategies to influence rule-setting in the MNC also remain 
dependent on the specific home and host country configuration, in which a micro-political 
game or conflict is embedded. The question as to what are relevant country-of-origin 
effects in micro-political game-playing is as open as the question of what role the host 
country plays. Harzing and Sorge’s findings (2003), for instance, showed quite strong 
country-of-origin effects on control strategies, which are well known to lead to frictions in 
MNCs. Morgan and Kristensen (2006, forthcoming) point to significant country-of-origin 
differences in shareholder value pressure and hence in the need for corporate restructuring 
and investment bargaining, two other well known causes of micro-political conflicts in 
MNCs. With regard to host country implications, the contributions of Forsgren (1990) and 
Dörrenbächer and Gammlegaard (in this Special Issue) highlight the role played by the 
stage of economic development of a host country in micro-political game playing of local 
subsidiaries, but further refinements in future research are needed here.  
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Last but not least, we want briefly to refer to the methodological problems emerging for 
ongoing and future research dealing with micro-politics in MNCs. These should not be 
underestimated given the traditional bias of quantitative studies in the field of international 
business. A qualitative project dealing with micro-politics in MNCs can be a challenging 
and sensitive enterprise in terms of gaining access, convincing HQ and subsidiary managers 
to take part and getting respondents to talk openly about these topics (Fischer, 2005). 
Micro-political conflicts in MNCs are also full of ambiguity and divergent interpretations. 
Interview partners are often reluctant to speak about their own and other important key 
players’ political strategies and interrelated conflicts. There are also problems arising from 
the many different languages as well as national and cultural contexts involved. Another 
methodological problem is validation, triangulation and generalization from the small 
number of cases studied. For most these problems solutions are at hand. Access is possible 
to more amenable companies, at least if anonymity is credibly assured. A multilingual, self 
reflecting team of researchers might cope with some of the ambiguity and sensitivity of 
issues, while the mastering of a wide set of quantitative and qualitative methods might help 
to overcome validation, triangulation and generalization problems. Thus, although 
researching micro-politics in MNCs might be a risky and sometimes difficult endeavor, the 
papers in this Special Issue demonstrate that undertaking such research is not only possible 
but can also provide many fascinating and new insights into the management of the MNC 
(see also the concluding discussion in the paper of Becker-Ritterspach in this Special 
Issue). 
 
Next, we shed some light on how the contributions of the papers in this Special Issue fit 
within this emerging field of research and make some concluding remarks, briefly 
summarizing what we have learned and exploring possible topics for future research.  
 
4. Re-framing micro-politics and conflicts in MNCs: The contributions of this Special 
Issue 
Leading scholars studying organizational power and politics have criticized dominant 
functionalist studies for having mainly adopted a managerialist orientation for which the 
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underlying assumptions are rarely articulated (Hardy and Clegg, 1996, p. 63). Thus, is the 
first contribution of this Special Issue. All papers are dealing with managerial problems, but 
they are doing so in a less functionalist and deterministic manner, as critics rightly call for. 
All papers address the underlying assumptions and diversity of strategies of key actors 
actively involved in various micro-political games in the MNC. Moreover, some papers 
(e.g. Sharpe or Becker-Ritterspach in this Special Issue) also identify the importance of 
considering the interests of other groups of employees when analyzing micro-politics and 
conflicts. A second contribution of this Special Issue is that all papers directly address the 
political nature of strategizing by key actors, an issue either neglected or interpreted as 
dysfunctional in mainstream studies of the MNC.  
 
Despite the fact that all papers deal with organizational change processes, it is evident that 
organizational power, micro-political strategizing and conflicts are differently 
conceptualized in each of the papers. To uncover their coherence and to elucidate the key 
ideas, we use Rothman and Friedman’s (2001) attempt to classify conflicts and politics in 
organizations in relation to the underlying concept of organizational power. According to 
these authors, we can distinguish three focuses of micro-political strategizing and conflicts: 
resources, interests and identities. 
 
The first identified way of framing is around resources (Rothman and Friedman, 2001, pp. 
585-587). In this perspective, micro-political conflicts and game playing focus on scarce 
resources and strategic goal setting in the MNC, aiming to increase the organizational 
power and autonomy of certain actors and groups of actors. Power is understood as the 
degree to which actors are able to access, protect and control scarce resources. Unlike 
former waves of empirical research, that gave the impression that such conflicts are either 
triggered by the HQ or by subsidiaries, the papers of this Special Issue, provide evidence 
that such conflicts might be triggered and continuously shaped by both HQ and subsidiary 
interactions. The papers of Dörrenbächer and Gammelgaard and Taplin are especially 
concerned with resource conflicts.  
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Christoph Dörrenbächer and Jens Gammelgaard’s paper studies subsidiary role 
development and found that the desire of local subsidiaries to keep or to upgrade their 
position within the MNC sometimes led to harsh clashes of interests. Based on an empirical 
study in Hungarian subsidiaries and their German HQs, the paper reveals firstly that, 
together with subsidiaries’ capabilities and localization advantages, HQ intended strategies 
were especially decisive in explaining role development in peripheral host countries. 
Secondly, micro-political HQ-subsidiary negotiations were an integral part of subsidiary 
role development because these bargaining processes were often the only way for 
subsidiaries to make explicit their capabilities to the HQ and introduce strategy options that 
lay beyond or even contradict HQ intended strategies.  
 
Ian Taplin’s paper in this Special Issue discusses the distribution and control of subsidiary 
power resources emerging in change management processes in the US textile industry. 
Comparing HQ inspired reorganization programs towards high performance work practices 
in foreign and national textile companies in the US, the author sheds light on the often 
subtle micro-political games, that subsidiary managers play by manipulating and 
interpreting the information surrounding the implementation of such programs. He 
concludes that the extent to which subsidiary managers can thereby justify self-serving 
actions – for instance by resisting the implementation of such reorganization measures – 
depends largely on the autonomy granted to them by the HQ.  
 
A second way of framing micro-politics and conflicts assumes that gaining or losing power 
is not so much about resources, but is caused by a diversity of interests among key players 
(Rothman and Friedman, 2001, pp. 588-590), related to various cultural, institutional and 
situational dynamics. This is also a core concern of recent institutionalist studies mentioned 
above. At the centre of analysis are the different bargaining strategies of key actors and the 
question of how they can be integrated or moderated. Interest conflicts are driven by 
different worldviews of key actors, and micro-political games are about local and global 
power sharing and not so much about who is gaining or losing power. Power is framed as 
‘concertive’, which means that actors try to develop a shared understanding, assuming that 
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each party’s interests are served by embracing conformity and obedience to authority, 
controlling conflict, and sometimes reducing or resolving it through collaboration in 
decision-making. Most of the papers of this Special Issue focused primarily on such ideas 
and research questions. We have two theoretical contributions, both of which address the 
problem of knowledge transfer in the MNC. There are also two empirical studies related to 
this frame, both in the car industry.  
 
Ulla Mense-Petermann’s paper focuses on intra-organizational conflicts arising during the 
process of organizational transnationalization in two Latin American subsidiaries of a 
German car manufacturer. The author maintains that conflicts might be labeled as either 
micro-political or inter-cultural, depending on how key organizational actors reflexively 
enact the process of transnationalization. Conflicts are likely to be thought of and labeled as 
intercultural when the transnational integration process is led by many expatriates and when 
there is no rule system commonly accepted by both the local subsidiary members and 
expatriates. In contrast, conflicts are more likely to be thought of and labeled as micro-
political, when the transnational integration is either led by local managers or when a 
common rule system exists. 
 
Diana Sharpe presents an ethnographic study of power and micro-politics within two UK 
subsidiaries of a Japanese automotive company. Drawing on a variety of concepts such as 
contextual rationality, contested rationality, institutional theory and labor process theory, 
the paper sheds light on how and why HQ inspired managerial control strategies were 
resisted and partially rejected on the shop floor. Sharpe argues that, while there was little 
collective resistance in the subsidiary that challenged managerial authority and the 
production process itself, the attempt of management to gain social control by transferring 
certain home country based ideas failed due to the workers’ embeddedness in their wider 
local context, including experiences with the labor market and industrial relations climates.  
 
The paper by Ed Clark and Mike Geppert is about bargaining and negotiation processes 
between the Western HQ and post-socialist subsidiary management and is concerned with 
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institution-building, knowledge transfer and micro-political strategizing. According the 
authors, international ventures in transition and other emerging economic contexts are 
typically based on asymmetrical power relationships, in which the balance of power is 
structurally weighted in favor of the HQ. Notwithstanding this dominance structure, the 
paper demonstrates that the strategic orientations of senior managers representing the 
Western MNC and managers representing the local enterprise – as well as the specific 
combination of these orientations and interests – provide a conceptual basis from which to 
explain the emergence of types of institutional order or disorder in post-socialist sites.  
 
The other conceptual contribution of this Special Issue deals with transfer problems in 
MNCs and stresses the discursive and dialectical nature of this process. Drawing on and 
integrating Scandinavian institutionalism and structuration theory, Florian Becker-
Ritterspach agues that games about knowledge integration are a crucial part of knowledge 
transfer in MNCs and must be understood as a ‘dialectic transformation’ that is constituted 
by human agency and embedded in social systemic contexts. According to this view, 
tangible actors and their social-systemic positioning are central to the analysis of micro-
political conflicts and their outcomes in MNCs.  
 
A third mode of framing relates micro-politics and conflicts to the reflexive creation of 
actors’ identities in organizations (Rothman and Friedman, 2001, pp. 590-593). Power is 
understood as ‘relational’ and requires analysis to go beyond competition for scarce 
resources or negotiating interest conflicts. The ‘identity’ frame is about challenging 
established and institutionally embedded local practices and is theoretically closely linked 
to ideas of action research, in which conflict is seen as an ‘intervention’ mechanism to 
create reflexive forms of organizational learning, e.g. double-loop learning (Argyris and 
Schön, 1996). At the centre of this perspective are conflicts that help to change the rules of 
the games and the identities of the involved actors. This appears to be highly relevant to 
MNCs that try to develop measures for intercultural learning or conflicts that arise from 
social integration measures. It is assumed that ‘better’ conflict management is not sufficient 
and that an alternative ‘allowing each party involved to speak about their needs and values 
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in the presence of their adversaries’ is required to stimulate learning (Rothman and 
Friedman, 2001, p. 591). In this process, actors will learn more about themselves and other 
players involved. We can assume that applying such an interventionist approach is quite 
demanding and sometimes impossible to organize for an MNC as a whole organization. 
However, such conflicts are crucial in building corporate identity across borders and hence 
need to be dealt with in a sensible way. 
 
Looking closer at the contributions to this Special Issue, it is noticeable that no author 
directly addresses identity conflicts. However, most papers refer indirectly to this problem 
and the lack of reflective learning and broader participation in decision-making across 
borders. This is rather obvious in the case of the two conceptual papers of this Special 
Issue. Both papers concentrate on the transfer of knowledge across borders and the 
necessity of local translation, where identity conflicts can be expected. Becker-Ritterspach 
finds that structural distance between the societal contexts, between the subunits within the 
MNC and within the subunit itself (e.g. in a local subsidiary) is crucial to understanding 
how political actors create their identities and how they learn. He emphasizes especially 
that positional power resources and personal features of key actors must be considered in 
order to understand whether and why knowledge transfer leads to conflicts and micro-
political infighting. Clark and Geppert argue in the same direction by stressing that the 
mutual involvement and learning of managers from both the Western HQ and the local 
subsidiaries in post-socialist subsidiaries are crucial for transnational institution building. 
On one hand, less reflective modes of learning can be expected when the HQ imposes 
ethnocentric strategies, leading to both severe conflicts and game-playing to secure and 
gain resources. On the other hand, a more exploratory and polycentric strategic approach 
may be expected to support more reflective learning modes, not just between Western and 
post-socialist managers, but also locally between managers and other employees and groups 
of employees. 
 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
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The basic difference between the papers collected in this Special Issue and mainstream IM 
approaches is that they treat micro-politics and conflicts as an unavoidable social reality 
and a natural mechanism of social interactions in MNCs that need to be further explored. 
Thus an a priori neutral position is taken in preference to regarding micro-politics and 
conflicts in MNCs as dysfunctional, the result of poor integration or as whatever caused a 
misfit with structural contingencies. Instead, all papers conceptualize micro-politics and 
conflicts to be normal consequences of managing and organizing across national borders 
and of tackling the subtle global integration-local responsiveness dilemma. The evolving 
picture of the MNC is that it is far from being a functional and ‘faceless’ organization but 
must rather be characterized by manifold and ongoing ‘ruptures, breaks and inconsistencies 
in the social fabric’ (Hatch, 1997, p. 321).  
 
There are two levels relevant in the analysis of micro-politics and conflicts in MNCs. The 
first is about studying culturally and societally shaped conflicts and distinguishes different 
levels of  ‘structural distance’ (e.g. Becker Ritterspach in this Special Issue). Here, we can 
expect genuine internationalization games, specific to the context of the MNC. The second 
level of analysis is concerned with the level of the subsidiary itself, where concepts 
developed elsewhere require local adaptation and translation, which processes often involve 
conflicts. Micro-political games at this level can also be very specifically related to the 
MNC but they can also be very similar to games played in organizations in general and, 
thus can be compared to those classical studies of Mintzberg and Crozier and Friedberg, as 
discussed earlier.  
 
In the last section we emphasized that the role of conflicts and micro-political game-
playing can be interpreted differently, dependent on how power and politics are 
conceptually framed. Most of the contributions of this Special Issue deal with resource and 
interest conflicts, although, they make implicit references to the issue of identity conflicts 
and its micro-political implications.  
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Finally, we want to raise three issues relevant for future research. First, the narrow focus of 
the relatively few studies addressing micro-politics and conflicts in MNCs must be 
broadened. A more pluralistic approach would help to understand and tackle more 
successfully the complexity of these topics. Current streams of research concentrate either 
mainly on resource conflicts, as for example in studies of political issues of subsidiary 
evolution or on institutionally generated interest conflicts in the MNC. However, papers in 
this Special Issue that relate micro-political conflicts to subjective and collective identities 
are a first step away from the structuralist bias in current international management 
research. There is a dearth of more in-depth research on micro-political processes around 
changes of subjective and collective identities of key players within a local subsidiary and 
between the HQ and a particular subsidiaries. 
 
Second, this type of research would also involve the move away from a primary focus on 
managerial influences in micro-political strategizing. Managers are often seen as the most 
powerful players, but this is only because deeper roots of identity conflicts are not taken 
into consideration. Thus, future research must broaden its view of the micro-political arena, 
by including, for example, questions about why and how other stakeholders such as 
shareholders or subsidiary employees get involved in or are not able to influence crucial 
aspects of certain micro-political games that enable or block reflective learning across 
organizational and national borders. Such an approach would question not only the 
authority of the HQ but also the authority and role of local managers and employees. 
 
Third, future research must also concentrate on the question of how key actors actually 
bring structures into play. This requires more research applying approaches that are less 
deterministic than those common in international business studies. Many of the 
contributions to this Special Issue show that conflicts and micro-political strategizing about 
resource allocations between HQ and subsidiaries might remain crucial in the MNC. 
However, more in-depth research is required to analyze how and why key actors in certain 
situations accept or resist certain HQ strategies. Moreover, we need more comparative 
research studying how certain interest conflicts are related to specific home country 
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features, such as coordination and control strategies which are likely to lead to more 
reflective learning between geographically and functionally separated subunits of the MNC 
and thus probably to more constructive solutions of emerging identity conflicts. Other 
comparative studies might concentrate on analyzing host country and company specific 
influences that enable or hinder local strategizing and identity construction. 
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